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National Electronic Health Record Systems as ‘Wicked Projects’: 
The Australian Experience 
 
Abstract 
Governments around the world are investing in large scale information and communication 
technology projects that are intended to modernize and streamline healthcare through the 
provision of nationally accessible electronic health records. In this way, they hope to ‘tame’ the 
complex ‘wicked’ problems facing healthcare, such as rising costs and fragmented delivery. 
However, these projects often encounter difficulties. Using a case study of Australia’s 20-year 
journey towards a national electronic health record system, we show how these projects can 
ironically take on the characteristics of the ‘wicked problems’ they are intended to solve, and 
how a failure to recognize and cope with these ‘wicked’ characteristics can lead to waste, 
conflict and frustration among potential users.  We suggest some alternative approaches to the 
management of large-scale ICT projects in healthcare and other public service sectors that deal 
with complex, sensitive data. 
 
Key words: information technology; electronic health records; wicked problems; Australia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Attempts by governments to procure and implement nationwide electronic health record systems 
(NEHRSs) – which policymakers argue are essential for improving service delivery and 
consumers’ experiences – have instead emerged as paradigm cases of public policy failure [1-4]. 
NEHRS projects frequently run into trouble, as diverse groups and individuals raise concerns 
about privacy, security and safety, and system implementers and users encounter the sheer 
technical difficulty of collating and exchanging data across multiple technology platforms [5-7]. 
In a sector with many different stakeholders, it has proved extraordinarily difficult to design 
technologies that satisfy a diverse range of clinical requirements in ways that are also cost 
effective, standardized and patient-centric. At the same time the policymaking and project 
management processes which initiate such investments and are meant to ensure that they deliver 
in a timely and cost effective way have been found to be seriously wanting [e.g. 8, 9]. In this 
article we argue that a significant source of difficulty lies in the propensity of politicians and 
policymakers to reduce the complex problems facing healthcare to matters involving the 
collection and exchange of information, a reduction that begs its own ultimately problematic 
‘solution’ in the form of NEHRSs.  
 
We use the experience of Australia’s long journey towards a NEHRS as an example of how 
attempts to ‘streamline’ healthcare through information and communication technology (ICT) 
can, if poorly managed, ironically exhibit the characteristics of the ‘wicked problems’ they were 
intended to solve. We begin by summarizing some salient features of wicked problems relevant 
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to our argument, and the attraction of ICT as an apparent ‘solution’ to the difficulties facing 
healthcare. After outlining our sources of data and methods, we use the Australian experience to 
illustrate the ways in which a failure to recognize the inherently wicked nature of large-scale ICT 
design and implementation has contributed to waste, delay and widespread dissatisfaction among 
intended users. We conclude by offering some suggestions for alternative approaches that may 
help to avoid some of the pitfalls experienced by nations that have attempted to implement large 
scale NEHRSs. Whilst our observations are based on the experience of healthcare ICT in one 
country, we believe they are relevant to other jurisdictions and to the governance and 
management of complex e-government projects in general.  
 
2.  The wicked problems of healthcare and the leap to NEHRSs as a ‘solution’ 
 
The concept of wicked problems has its origins in a critique developed by Horst Rittel and 
Melvin Webber of rational ‘engineering’ approaches to urban and social planning [10]. The 
concept has proved attractive to public policy scholars and practitioners struggling to understand 
why so many social problems are difficult or impossible to solve, despite our capacity to devise 
seemingly sensible projects and programs to address them [11-13]. Rittel and Webber argue that 
policymakers confront two types of problems in their work – the ‘tame’ and the ‘wicked’.  Tame 
problems are relatively well defined and their causes are understood well enough to provide 
reliable suggestions for possible solutions. The information required to reach those solutions, 
along with procedures for doing so, are readily accessible.  Those working on or interested in 
tame problems generally agree about problem definitions, causes and solutions. Wicked 
problems and their causes, on the other hand, are much more difficult to define and identify. 
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They emerge in complex environments in which many interacting and interdependent elements – 
human, social, cultural, technical and political – combine to create intractable dilemmas that can 
endure without resolution for decades.  As the causes of wicked problems such as poverty, crime, 
and rising healthcare costs are multiple, unclear and contested, proposed ‘solutions’ often rely on 
a propensity to define ‘the problem’ in particular, circumscribed terms. For example, NEHRSs 
can plausibly ‘solve’ problems in healthcare, as long as those problems are attributed to 
deficiencies in the availability of and means of sharing information. Another characteristic of 
wicked problems is that when ‘solutions’ are implemented, they often have unintended 
consequences, thereby generating further problems of their own [10,13].  
 
The health policy arena is of course rife with wicked problems [12,14]. Rising costs can be 
attributed to multiple interacting causes – ageing populations, unhealthy lifestyles, chronic 
diseases and co-morbidities, and inefficiencies and fragmentation in the delivery of care, to name 
just some. These ‘causes’ are themselves multidimensional with many possible ‘solutions’ that 
straddle the remit of multiple organizations and professional groups.  Moreover, the health sector 
exemplifies the circularity and interdependence of wicked problems and solutions. Phenomena 
currently identified as ‘problems’, such as ageing populations and chronic ailments, are the 
consequences of earlier ‘solutions’ that reduced the rate of infectious disease and prolonged life. 
Likewise, while specialization in healthcare delivery has improved treatment, it has also led to 
rising costs and fragmentation in services [14]. Policymakers in many nations have initiated 
repeated cycles of reform, in attempts to reduce costs while improving outcomes [15,16]. As is 
typical of wicked problems, however, it is difficult to discern with any certainty what ‘works’ 
and what doesn’t, and recurrent rounds of reform seem to be a feature of health policy in many 
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nations, as successive governments seek to remedy the negative consequences of previous 
changes [17].   
 
Advocates of NEHRSs frequently depict healthcare as a ‘information intensive’ industry, with 
many of its problems attributed to deficits in data collection, storage and exchange [e.g. 18,19]. 
Proponents claim that NEHRSs will provide more accurate, legible and accessible information 
than their paper-based counterparts. Errors will be more readily detected and corrected. Tests 
will not have to be repeated because paper results have been lost or are stored elsewhere. At the 
same time, ‘clinicians will have at their fingertips all of the information needed to provide the 
best care' [20, p. iii] whilst people will ‘be spared the ritual of repeating their name, address, 
previous and recent medical history to every [provider] they have to deal with’ [21, p. 24]. 
Furthermore, citizens who have access to their own electronic records will become empowered 
‘consumers’, more able to engage in their own care, thereby reducing their reliance on the 
healthcare system [22].  
 
However, the sharing of health data on a national scale across complex organizational and other 
boundaries is still a novel concept and its impacts on the quality, safety and efficiency of care 
remain an active and contested area of debate and investigation [23,24]. As a result, 
policymakers seeking advice on the potential benefits of NEHRSs often rely on models and 
extrapolations from pilot trials which generally predict considerable savings from the 
implementation of the technology. For example, an Australian study claimed that the increased 
productivity and reduction in adverse events resulting from the introduction of a NEHRS would 
save the nation up to $AU7.9 billion over 10 years [25]. 
5 
 
 
Given the intuitive appeal of NEHRSs as a means of taming wicked healthcare problems and the 
predicted savings that could follow, it is not surprising that many governments have invested in 
the technology. The risks associated with implementation have often been underestimated, and 
assumed to be detectable and controllable through popular software engineering tools. These 
tools frame system development as a linear process whose interface with the contexts in which 
the systems are supposed to work is limited to requirements gathering, and sporadic 
opportunities for end users to comment on evolving specifications and architectures [26,27]. 
Below, we illustrate some of the ways in which NEHRS projects and their contexts frustrate 
attempts to manage them according to these linear processes. First, however, we provide some 
background on the research design, data sources and methods that have informed this article.  
 
3.  Research design, data sources and methods 
 
The following case is drawn from a broader retrospective and comparative study of attempts 
since the 1990s to build regional and national systems for sharing electronic health data in 
Australia and England [4,28-30]. In this article we seek to understand why attempts to implement 
EHRSs at a national scale so frequently run into trouble and why the lessons learnt seemingly do 
not inform efforts to rescue existing projects or subsequent initiatives. In order to explore these 
issues, we draw on a nearly two decades long series of policy initiatives and projects that aimed 
to develop a NEHRS in Australia. We believe the Australian example is relevant because of the 
longevity of the experience and the opportunities that this could be assumed to have offered 
policymakers to learn from past developments and mistakes. At the same time, Australia has 
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been independently evaluated as a leader in the development of some e-enabled public services 
on a national scale, for example in the taxation system, and to have accomplished this in the 
context of a federal government structure [31]. In healthcare such development faces particular 
challenges given the complexity of the funding models in a federated structure and the 
sometimes confused responsibilities of the commonwealth and states in relation to different 
aspects of care delivery [32]. 
 
Our data consist primarily of publicly available documents, supplemented with interviews with 
key informants involved with the two most significant NEHRS projects attempted since 2000. 
Documents included reports from government enquiries, ministerial and policy statements, 
submissions to governments by individuals and interest groups, system architectures, blog posts, 
position statements by professional bodies and lobby groups interested in NEHRSs, newspaper 
articles and articles published in specialist journals and magazines. The documents were 
organized for analysis using Zotero software, which enables sorting and searching of the data. A 
chronology of significant events was constructed, and key areas of tension and difficulty 
identified for further analysis. 
 
We interviewed 13 individuals who were close to or personally involved in NEHRS 
development in Australia. Some of these informants held high ranking positions in the 
organizations tasked with design and implementation. Interviews were used to clarify details 
about the processes that were undertaken, and to provide feedback on our developing ideas. 
Subjects were also invited to reflect on the overall trajectories of the projects – what, in their 
view, had worked reasonably well, and what could have been done differently.  
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Our overall methodological approach involved ‘heuristic’ as opposed to statistical generalization 
and was aimed at ‘refining our analytical understanding’ of the phenomena of interest. Such 
generalization emerges from a dialogue between theoretical perspectives and empirical data, with 
‘the empirical as a precondition for the development of the theoretical, and the theoretical as an 
indispensable tool for the exploration of the empirical’ [33, p. 295, see also 34]. From the broad 
range of perspectives and theoretical frameworks available to us as a research team – which is 
comprised of academics and practitioners with backgrounds in medicine, health informatics, 
management and the social sciences – the concept of wicked problems seemed to hold promise 
as a conceptual focus that could help explain the difficulties that have been encountered during 
attempts to build NEHRSs in Australia and elsewhere. Developing ideas were circulated among 
the team to produce the narrative and argument below.  
 
4.  Becoming the ‘wicked problem’ instead of solving it - NEHRSs in Australia. 
 
According to Head [13, p. 103], wicked problems are characterized by (a) a complexity of 
elements, subsystems and interdependencies; (b) uncertainty in relation to risks, consequences of 
actions, and changing patterns of funding, priorities and expectations; and (c) a divergence in 
viewpoints and values. We now show how attempts to design and implement a NEHRS in 
Australia exhibit many of these features. In our view, the dissatisfaction expressed by providers 
and recipients of care regarding what they see as suboptimal outcomes from these attempts can 
be attributed to a failure on the part of policymakers and project managers to adequately 
recognize and address these wickedly problematic aspects of NEHRS projects.  
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We suggest that there are three aspects to this failure that help explain the disappointing results 
of investments in two large-scale NEHRS initiatives – a project called HealthConnect which was 
abandoned after an estimated expenditure of $AU5 billion [35]1 and a second attempt which, 
three years after being launched in 2012, was used by only a small proportion of citizens and 
care providers [36]. First, politicians and policymakers failed to recognize the complexity and 
risk inherent in NEHRS projects, succumbing instead to a 'dangerous enthusiasm’ for electronic 
‘solutions’ to the problems facing healthcare. This first failure generated a second shortcoming, 
namely, the use of conventional project management approaches which, although effective for 
‘tame’ situations, are highly challenged in multi-stakeholder environments and projects with 
porous boundaries [37]. Finally, there was an unwillingness to learn from these failed 
approaches. Divergent priorities and values were not viewed as integral aspects of the projects, 
presenting opportunities for productive negotiation and development, but rather as troublesome 
‘barriers’ to be ignored or overcome.  
 
4.1 Failure to recognize and understand complexity 
 
The history of NEHRSs in Australia is peppered with policy statements that exhibit enthusiastic 
support for the technology These can be found in the earliest pronouncements, for example a 
joint ministerial statement in 1992  that called for a ‘health communications network’ that would 
provide ‘more efficient, effective and continuous patient care across health sector boundaries’ 
                                                 
1 The Department of Health has removed the HealthConnect documents from its website. However, they can be 
accessed by entering http://www.health.gov.au/internet/hconnect/publishing.nsf/Content/home into the Internet 
Archive Wayback Machine at web.archive.org 
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[38] through to recent times, when the Federal Health Minister claimed that a ‘rebooted 
personalised My Health Record’  would give ‘instant access to the information needed to treat 
patients safely and efficiently without having to gamble on unknowns in their medical history’ 
[39]. (See Table 1 for a chronology of key events). 
 
In the late 1990s, such sentiments legitimized public investments in Australia’s first attempt to 
build a NEHRS [40]. This system, called HealthConnect, would provide a ‘health information 
network’ for all Australians by 2010 [41]. The initial plan was to spend two years on research, 
development and pilot trials, followed by an incremental rollout that would update and connect 
existing ICT systems. The plan was abruptly disrupted in 2004 when, even before the pilot trials 
had ended, Federal Health Minister (and later Prime Minister) Tony Abbott announced that 
rollouts of HealthConnect would soon commence.  
 
This unexpected announcement reportedly ‘stunned stakeholders’ as system architectures, 
standards and governance arrangements were far from complete [42]. Abbott was apparently 
frustrated by the slow pace of ICT in health, comparing it to the finance sector which was 
making rapid progress in developing e-commerce. If financial institutions could connect 
electronically, he claimed, the health sector’s failure to do so must be due to incompetence and 
outdated attitudes [43].  A senior figure in the HealthConnect project team told us in interview 
that Abbott and ‘some of the State ministers … completely misunderstood how hard and 
complicated it would be’. For them ‘it’s just a matter of building a great big computer’.  
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When Abbott tried to expedite the roll out, preparations for implementation revealed the 
complexity of the task at hand. The legal firm Clayton Utz was contracted to examine the 
medico-legal issues associated with the system. One of the firm’s partners summarized the 
situation neatly in a newspaper report:   
There's a whole bunch of questions. How do you determine liability in a shared 
record? How do you determine the extent of the consent given? Who owns the 
information? How do you authorise documents that currently require a signature? 
What are the security requirements? It's vast [44].  
There were also tensions among the federal, State and territory jurisdictions regarding the roll 
out. Responsibilities for healthcare in Australia are split among these jurisdictions, as well as 
private and community sector organizations. Most notably for the development of a NEHRS in 
Australia, primary care is funded largely through a national insurance scheme, while state and 
territory governments are responsible for the management of public hospitals, including their 
ICT systems [32]. Building a NEHRS thus requires cooperation among jurisdictions and their 
advisory bodies, as well as Standards Australia, the medical software industry and potential 
users. HealthConnect was administered out of a federal department, and encountered problems, 
even 'deep mistrust' according to some [45, p. 7], in its relationships with state health 
departments. According to one of our interview informants, a senior health administrator who 
has been involved in multiple state and federal ICT projects, a lack of involvement by the states 
was ‘the main reason’ that HealthConnect failed: ‘the states didn’t understand it, didn’t buy in, 
didn’t invest, didn’t support’. Another of our informants told us that although the states ‘were all 
sold on the concept’, the project still ‘caused them considerable anxiety’. By the middle of 2005, 
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in the face of such realities HealthConnect was downgraded by the federal government from a 
‘national health information network’ to a ‘change management strategy’ [46]. 
 
In 2009, enthusiasm for digital solutions to problems in healthcare were rekindled, this time in 
the context of a sweeping reform initiative instituted by the Rudd Labor government. According 
to the expert body convened to drive this reform,   
 
The introduction of a person-controlled electronic health record for each Australian is one 
of the most important systemic opportunities to improve the quality and safety of health 
care, reduce waste and inefficiency, and improve continuity and health outcomes for 
patients [25, p. 8]. 
 
In the following year, federal funds of $AU467 million were allocated to build a nation-wide 
person-controlled electronic health record (PCEHR). Federal health minister Nicola Roxon 
adopted the reform commission’s recommendation to set ‘a definite start date’ of July 2012 
for the system as this would help to end the protracted ‘talkfest’ which, in its view, had 
inhibited progress to date [25, p. 131].  
Again policymakers, this time with the help of a National e-Health Transition Authority 
(NEHTA), rushed towards a ‘solution’. Soon after the funding announcement, NEHTA and 
the Department of Health and Ageing drafted a Concept of Operations document that 
outlined how the PCEHR would work. The system would be organized around a ‘shared 
health summary’ that could be supplemented with additional clinical documents and patients’ 
own private notes. Although the shared health summary would be curated by ‘nominated 
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providers’ it would be ‘owned’ and controlled by citizens, who could choose to withhold 
information if they wished. It would be a parallel system, that is, doctors would be required to 
keep their own records as well. Significantly, participation was to be optional for both 
providers and healthcare recipients [47]. 
Equally significant was the target date set by Federal health minister Nicola Roxon for the 
system to go ‘on-line’. This was to be 1 July 2012, a date she insisted upon in the face of 
persistent claims that the system and its associated standards and governance arrangements 
would not be ready by then [48, 49]. Inevitably, the system that ‘went live’ in July 2012 was 
indeed very basic. Citizens could register an interest in obtaining a PCEHR on 
www.ehealthinfo.gov.au, but the creation of records was delayed until GP software was rolled 
out later in the year [50]. By February 2013, seven months after the launch, fewer than one 
percent of the nation’s healthcare providers were registered to access the PCEHR [51].  In the 
first year, only 2.7 percent of a population of around 22 million people had registered for a 
PCEHR, and 4,585 shared health summaries had been uploaded [52]. There were reports of 
faulty data appearing in people’s records [53] and patient information being ‘garbled and 
confused’ when presented to doctors [54]. When it appeared that the government would miss its 
target of 500,000 patient registrations in the first year, ‘sign up squads’ were sent into hospitals 
and nursing homes [55]. The pursuit of what were perceived by clinicians in particular as 
superficial measures of progress such as the number of citizen registrations, bred further 
cynicism and disengagement, as they failed to acknowledge deeper systemic problems [56]. 
Although government agencies declared the PCEHR a ‘success’ [57], several of NEHTA’s key 
clinical advisors resigned ‘in frustration’ as their concerns went unheeded. Their leader later 
described the PCEHR as ‘shambolic’ [56].  
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4.2 The weaknesses of a conventional approach to managing uncertainty and risk 
 
Both of Australia’s significant NEHRS projects used what could be described as conventional 
approaches to system design. That is, they were guided by an assumption that user requirements 
could be ‘captured’ early in the design process and inscribed into abstract plans and 
architectures. Uncertainties and risks could be managed by consulting stakeholders, devising 
appropriate governance arrangements and educating potential users [58]. The HealthConnect 
project team followed what it saw as ‘best practice’ in public sector ICT system design at the 
time – a ‘Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework’ that was developed in the Unites States 
[59]. Within this framework, entities and processes were conceptualized in idealized terms, 
‘independent of any system or implementation considerations and organizational constraints’ 
[26, p. 53]. The HealthConnect architecture defined the functions of the system, such as 
registration, identification and authentication of users, collection, storage and exchange of data.  
 
The first version was produced by bureaucrats in the Department of Health and Ageing, none of 
hom had expertise in the day-to-day delivery of care in the public or private sector. The draft was 
reviewed by a specially convened working group comprised of clinicians, health bureaucrats, 
academics, a consumer representative and health informaticians.  This group’s task was to 
‘socialize’ it (interview, policy advisor) and ‘get it to a point where it is acceptable for public 
consumption’ (interview, health informatician and member of architecture working group). The 
working party was disbanded after giving its advice and took no further part in architecture 
development. According to a person who was involved in HealthConnect in an advisory 
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capacity, ‘the business architecture was being run by people who did not understand the business 
of health care delivery’.  
 
Many of the stakeholders who were consulted on the architecture iterations, including doctors, 
nurses and consumer representatives, found it difficult to engage with an abstract document that 
deliberately eschewed any consideration of the contexts in which healthcare encounters took 
place. During one consultation session, a ‘response form’ was handed out that included the 
question ‘Is the proposed structure for HealthConnect appropriate? According to a consultant’s 
report that analyzed the feedback, ‘The views of several respondents are summarized by the 
words of one: “The information is so general that no useful comment can be made”’ [60, p. 25]. 
Healthcare provider organizations called on the HealthConnect team to pay more attention to the 
contextual richness and variability of their working environments, and to build on and support, 
rather than replace, their existing technologies and routines [61-63]. The General Practice 
Computing Group pointed out that  
 
General practice is a ‘people service’ and as such successful implementation will require 
consideration of human factors: how do general practitioners enter data currently, what is 
the attitude of the general practitioner to workflow issues, how do general practitioners 
want to receive radiology and pathology (i.e. as a summary or the full report) etc. [63, p. 
9]. 
 
Such calls were overtaken by events as outlined above and the project was scaled back before 
‘human factors’ could be given their due consideration. 
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Many of the problems that plagued HealthConnect stem from an assumption that the system 
could be centrally planned by bureaucrats, and sporadic consultation with potential users would 
help refine the details. Post-implementation ‘change management’ and ‘benefits realization’ 
would ensure ready adoption [64,65]. Instead, the technology-driven approach to managing the 
project was overwhelmed by the complexity presented by the diversity of interests and 
expectations of doctors, nurses, administrators and recipients of care, the concerns of privacy and 
consumer advocates, the capacities of ICT vendors and legacy systems already in place, the 
availability of funds, the priorities of federal and state jurisdictions, medico-legal uncertainties, 
and patchy and inconsistent privacy laws [66]. Amidst this tangle of interacting elements were 
some enduring tensions, a prime example being a conflict between those who seek to enhance 
the widespread availability of individual health information, and those who see such availability 
as a threat to privacy.  
 
4.3 Inability to reach compromise and learn from divergent viewpoints and values 
 
The abstract and rigid HealthConnect architectures did not facilitate the sort of productive 
engagement that would enable workable compromises among stakeholders with different 
priorities and preferences to be negotiated. Nevertheless, when interest in a NEHRS re-
emerged several years after HealthConnect’s demise, policymakers once again issued a 
predesigned blueprint for the system’s operations, this time in the guise of a Concept of 
Operations document. Given the short time frame (less than 18 months) consultation was 
swift and changes in response to feedback were minimal. As the push towards 
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implementation intensified, risks, uncertainties and differences of opinion came ever more 
forcefully to the surface. One of the most enduring conflicts affecting the revised attempt to 
develop a NEHRS in Australia has revolved around the desirability and consequences of 
‘personal control’, that is, the capacity of citizens to selectively withhold information from 
the electronic record that appears in the national system.  
Doctors, as represented by the Australian Medical Association (AMA) and the Royal 
Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP) have consistently argued that the 
clinical utility and therefore professional uptake of a NEHRS depends on the reliable 
availability of ‘core clinical data’ such as current medications, allergies, adverse events and 
recent diagnostic results [e, g, 67, 68]. The capacity of ‘personal control’ to render the data 
incomplete would, according to the AMA ‘de-medicalize’ the system [69].  In its view, a 
‘disproportionate emphasis given to the concerns of an extreme minority who wish to mask 
details of their health record’ would lead to a system that was hampered by ‘unacceptable 
complexities’ [70, p. 2].  
The Consumers Health Forum (CHF) on the other hand, has consistently lobbied for citizen 
control over the contents of, and access to, their records. According to CHF CEO Carol 
Bennet, ‘Consumers won't engage if there is an attitude that comes from the dark ages that 
doctor knows best’ [quoted in 71]. When the AMA refused to back down, the CHF 
‘slammed’ the association for a perceived ‘refusal to accept that the world has moved on 
from the “secret doctors' business” of paper-based records that patients rarely see’ [72]. The 
Australian Privacy Foundation (APF) also favoured personal control but argued that because 
the documents in the PCEHR were accessible to the government bureaucrats who administer 
the system, the ‘personal control’ features trumpeted by its supporters were largely illusory. 
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According to the APF, the data consolidation enabled by a NEHRS was ‘inherently risky’ 
because it created a ‘honey pot’ of personal information that would attract those who sought 
to access private information for ulterior purposes. In its view, while ICT can help improve 
care, the focus should be on facilitating a federated infrastructure that would allow providers 
to communicate with each other on an as-needed basis without a centralized repository of 
data [73].  
During the federal election year of 2013, the opposition conservative parties exploited the 
PCEHR’s difficulties, claiming that the ‘$1 billion e-health debacle … speaks volumes about 
Labor’s incompetence’ [74]. Critics claimed that the PCEHR was difficult to use, contained 
mistakes, had little clinical utility and was not accessible in most hospitals [56]. After being 
elected, the new conservative coalition initiated a review of the system [75].  
 
Some of the submissions to the review were highly critical. For example, the RACGP 
claimed that: 
The development program has been driven politically and by a desire for volume 
rather than high-quality, useful clinical information. The clinical community has not 
been effectively engaged in product development, especially with the current release 
program. This has resulted in a system that fails to meet clinical requirements, is not 
acceptable nor sustainable [76, p. 3]. 
The review panel identified 14 ‘key and repeating concerns’ in the feedback [75, p. 14-15]. 
The most frequently raised of these was: 
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The divide between clinicians who are concerned with data accuracy under a patient 
controlled model and consumers and others who identify the personally controlled 
nature of the electronic record as fundamental.  
Despite widespread criticisms, the panel recommended that ‘it is worth the effort to find a way 
through the many challenges, conflicting requirements and varying but valid opinions to 
continue with the build of this important national asset’ [75, p. 4]. It noted, however, that the 
‘value proposition for users’ would need to be improved through better design, switching to an 
opt-out model and facilitating the inclusion of pathology results and diagnostic images, neither of 
which was available due to arguments over the timing and authorization of uploads [75, 77].  The 
panel also proposed a name change, and a reconfiguration of governance arrangements. Under an 
opt-out model, all citizens would receive a MyHR unless they took steps to be excluded. The 
personal control feature should be retained, but there should be a ‘flag’ added to ‘hidden’ data 
that would allow the ‘clinical author’ of the data to discuss the impact of such ‘control’ with the 
relevant patient [75, p. 17].  
 
Doctors’ groups and the CHF welcomed the shift to opt-out, though doctors remained cautious. 
The RACGP supported the ‘further development’ of the PCEHR, but noted that there was 
‘ongoing confusion’ about its purpose [78, p. 3]. The AMA also expressed support for ‘a 
properly built and governed PCEHR system’ and continued to lobby for the removal of personal 
control over key health details [79, pp 1-2]. Privacy advocates, on the other hand, opposed the 
move [80]. A parliamentary committee on human rights argued that the reasons for shifting to 
opt-out were not ‘pressing and substantial enough’ to warrant limiting citizens’ right to privacy 
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[81]. The dissenting voices were overruled, however. Legislation to enable changes to the 
PCEHR was passed in 2015 and trials of an opt-out system are scheduled for 2016 [82].  
 
5. Managing wickedly problematic projects  
 
Given the waste and frustration that typically attend large scale health ICT projects it is 
important to continue searching for ‘better’ ways of managing them. When it comes to wicked 
problems, however, it would be foolish to offer a step-wise process or model as a route to 
‘success’ as such techniques are designed for situations that are tame. Nevertheless, Head’s 
criteria above are not only useful for highlighting the shortcomings of the Australian approach 
but also for exploring ways in which some of the problematic aspects of wicked ICT projects 
might be rendered more tractable.    
 
First, given the complexity of interdependent elements, the diversity of viewpoints and the 
uncertain risks and consequences, developing ‘solutions’ in the form of documents such as the 
HeathConnect architectures and later the PCEHR Concepts of Operations is counterproductive. 
Moreover, in the Australian case, these solutions were developed by bureaucrats and ICT 
specialists, not by people with a deep understanding of the ways in which information is created 
and used in healthcare. Feedback was sought from people with such knowledge, but within the 
context of the already-existing blueprints. Furthermore, these blueprints were too abstract and 
generic to enable the identification and management of the many diverse and interlocking 
subsystems that would have to be mutually adjusted to support each other, such as work routines, 
legacy systems, funding streams and regulatory practices. By launching the projects with grand 
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overarching designs, the Department of Health and Ageing and its advisory bodies closed off any 
possibilities for alternative approaches such as, for example, an incremental provider-led process 
that explored different ways that ICT could be used to improve information flows across the 
healthcare sector. Any alternative mode of proceeding would of course also have to cope with a 
complexity of interconnecting elements, uncertainties and diverse viewpoints. However, there is 
evidence that these challenges can to some extent be managed at local and regional scales. Face-
to-face collaboration enabled data sharing to occur during the HealthConnect regional pilot trials 
[83], and international experience shows that high levels of clinical engagement in the 
development of digital networks that build on existing tacit and/or explicit consent arrangements 
which allow data sharing in the interests of care, can prove acceptable and useful. Examples of 
such systems can be found in Denmark, New Zealand and the Netherlands, nations that are 
frequently acknowledged as leaders in health ICT development and use ([84-86]. It is significant, 
however, that none of these nations has succeeded in building the sort of nationally accessible 
and static repositories of individual health data that have been so attractive to policymakers in 
Australia. Attempts to build such systems have run into familiar difficulties – concerns about 
privacy, consent, data quality and clinical utility. Instead, where success has been achieved, it 
has been in the timely exchange of relevant health data for particular circumstances, rather than 
the compilation of static repositories [6, 87, 88]. As we have seen, the latter raise thorny issues of 
information ownership, liability and responsibility for data quality, aspects of NEHRSs that have 
proved particularly intractable.   
 
Building workable regional health ICT systems through close collaboration among providers, 
patients, developers and regulators, and then federating them into larger networks, may provide a 
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means of escaping the worst pitfalls of large-scale pre-designed NEHRS implementations. 
However, given the wicked nature of the problems they confront, any system is likely to be a 
temporary settlement carved out of ongoing debates and uncertainty. Perhaps the most deeply 
problematic aspect of healthcare ICT, especially when it comes to large scale systems accessible 
to and/or managed by governments, concerns the privacy of citizens whose information they 
contain. One reason that privacy is so contentious is that it is rooted in paradox. The properties of 
ICT that make it so attractive to citizens and policymakers also render it risky and threatening. 
As Tsoukas has succinctly noted, 'The information society spawns paradoxes that prevent it from 
satisfying the temptations it creates' [89, p. 828].  
 
The possibilities of widespread easy access to health information that tempt the proponents of 
NEHRS are frustrated by a mirror image of intrusive surveillance and an irretrievable loss of 
privacy. Callen and Austin suggest that digital technologies such as NEHRS test the limits of a 
modernist world view that is based on ‘assumptions of essentially linear, teleological lines of 
progress, ontological stability, epistemological certainty, and the promise of enlightened human 
agency’ [90, p. 21]. Such assumptions hold reasonably well when dealing with tame problems 
but have little purchase on the wickeder aspects of digital technologies, such as those concerning 
privacy. In relation to the issue of privacy in the digital age Callen and Austin claim that ‘neither 
retreat [to a pre-digital age] nor regulation is possible’. Instead, we are being forced to consider 
‘in what form or even whether [privacy] can exist in ways we recognize’ [90, p. 33].  Current 
debates and tensions around privacy, purpose and risk in relation to NEHRSs are manifestations 
of a struggle to come to terms with the implications of a technology that offers so many 
possibilities, while generating new risks, challenges and uncertainties.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The story of NEHRSs in Australia is far from over and new enthusiasms for the use of ‘big’ and 
‘open’ data to drive innovation in the healthcare sector suggest that the digital health record is a 
thin end of a much larger digitalization ‘wedge’. It remains to be seen whether the proposed shift 
to an opt-out model and financial incentives for use by GPs [91] will help to evolve the 
Australian MyHR system into a more useful tool that is valued by those delivering and receiving 
healthcare. Regardless of what happens in the future, we now have 15 years of experience of 
attempts to build a workable NEHRS. It is timely to reflect on the consequences of the decisions 
that have been made and the processes that have been undertaken, in order to ascertain what 
might be learned about the development and implementation of ICT in the healthcare sector. 
Examining major policy ‘blunders’ in the UK, including the ill-fated attempt to introduce 
NEHRS in the English NHS, King and Crewe suggest that the inherent complexity of these often 
‘hyper-ambitious’ endeavours is beyond the competence of the politicians who initiate them and 
the civil servants who advise them. Moreover, the projects typically progress in the absence of 
appropriate means of tracking progress and allocating accountability, with the consequence that 
the scale and gravity of the ‘blunder’ usually emerges slowly and only after most of the damage 
has been done [9, loc]. As they go on to suggest, one set of lessons revolves around getting the 
‘right people in the room’ when decisions to initiate large-scale projects are made and seeking 
ways to ensure that an ‘operational disconnect’ does not emerge between the realities of the 
problems facing healthcare and what might assist in tackling them, and the ‘magical’ properties 
all too often associated with ICT by politicians [9. loc. 4916-4946]. 
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TABLE 1: The Development of NEHRSs in Australia 
Date Key Events 
1991-92 Australian health ministers propose a ‘Health Communication Network’ 
2000 Launch of HealthConnect , a 5-10 year project to build a ‘national health 
information network for all Australians’. 
2004 Health minister Abbott announces expedited national roll out of HealthConnect. 
2005 HealthConnect reconfigured to a modest ‘change management strategy’. 
National e-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) established to ‘identify and 
develop the necessary foundations for e-health’. 
2009 National Hospital and Health Reform Commission recommends a ‘personally 
controlled’ electronic health record (PCEHR) to the Labor Federal Government 
2010 May: Federal Labor Government commits $467 million in its Budget to 
implementation of PCHER by July 2012  
28th June: Health Identifiers Act passed paving way for all Australians to be 
issued with a unique health identification number. 
2011 Apr April: Draft Concept of Operations: Relating to the introduction of a PCEHR 
system released. Consultation until June. 
September: Federal Minister for Health and Ageing Roxon, releases revised 
version of Concept of Operations: Relating to the introduction of a PCEHR 
system along with draft legislation for a Personally Controlled Electronic Health 
Records (PCEHR) Bill. 
2012 26th June: Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records (PCEHR) Act 
passed. 
1st July:  PCEHR goes 'live' and citizens able to register on-line amidst press 
reports of technical problems and little interest by healthcare providers and 
consumers 
2013 August: 2.7% of population had registered for a PCEHR and little functionality 
available to users. 
November: New Federal Coalition Government Announces Review of PCEHR 
chaired by Richard Royle, Executive Director of a private hospital. 
2014 January: Royle Review reports to Government but findings not published for 
five months until successful Freedom of Information request. 
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2015 May: Federal government finally responds to review and confirms new funding 
in Budget to ‘restructure’ the PCHER and indicates intention to make the system 
‘opt-out’. 
2016 July: Proposed date for eHealth Commission to replace NEHTA and administer 
renamed ‘My Health Record’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
